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                                                          Abstract                                                                                                                                                                               
In this paper, we incorporate regret into the decision-making process of a pension fund and derive the optimal 
asset allocation of a final-wealth-maximizing pension fund in the accumulation and decumulation phases. We 
find that the optimal asset allocation must be congruent in both phases if and only if the pension fund is upside 
regret averse. In particular, our results suggest that allocation to risky assets must increase through time in the 
accumulation and decumulation phases so that the pension fund can realize gains from any upsides in the risky 
asset market, thereby maximizing final wealth and limiting the feeling of regret ex-post. Although decisions in 
both phases are congruent, we find that the optimal asset allocation generally depends on wealth levels. This 
evidence implies that separate management of the accumulation and decumulation phases of a pension fund 
decreases available wealth levels and is not an optimal strategy. 
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1. Introduction 
The major contribution of this paper lies in the use of regret theory to analyze the optimal asset allocation of a 
pension fund that aims to maximize the expected modified utility of its final wealth. Unlike in the standard 
expected utility framework wherein a pension fund independently considers only the investment choices it makes 
and performs expected utility maximization based on these choices, without recourse to other potential choices 
that could have been made, regret theory gives room for the pension fund to account for its favoured investment 
choices as well as other feasible investment choices that could be made. In essence, the fund pension experiences 
regret if the outcome of its investment choices is worse than the outcome of at least one of the forgone investment 
choices, and it rejoices if otherwise. Thus, because of the possibility of future regret, the objective function—the 
expected modified utility of the pension fund’s final wealth— is set up in such a way as to incorporate a function 
that captures feelings of potential regret. This way, we are able to develop a set-up aimed at examining the extent 
to which the anticipation of future regret influences current investment choices and optimal asset allocation of a 
pension fund. The presence of a regret function distinguishes our framework, the regret theory framework, from 
traditional expected utility framework and serves as a novel contribution to the literature.. 
Accessible literature on asset allocation problems and optimal portfolio strategies for pension funds largely 
neglects regret theory and widely favors traditional expected utility maximization.  In addition to the many 
documented limitations and violations of the traditional expected utility theory so elegantly demonstrated in the 
behavioral economics literature, our major discontent with the theory is that it assumes economic agents consider 
each outcome independently and disregard other possible outcomes. This can be interpreted to mean that pension 
fund managers, for example, care only about the investment choices they make. However, in practice, fund 
managers do experience a feeling of regret whenever forgone investment choices yield better returns ex-post than 
the choices they made ex-ante. This causes them to incorporate the possibility of regret in their subsequent 
investment decisions and asset allocation. As a simple illustration, consider a fund manager who can receive a $5 
return on investment for each dollar invested in the debt capital market and either a $7.5 or $1.5 return on 
investment for each dollar invested in the equity capital market. If he takes a huge position in the equity capital 
market and finally receives a $1.5 return on investment for each dollar invested, he almost surely will experience 
a feeling of regret for getting less than he could have gotten had he taken most positions in the debt capital 
market. Next time, this experience will shape his investment decisions and therefore make him averse to regret, 
and this aversion will induce him to incorporate regret into his decision-making process. Despite this intuitive 
perspective on regret, to the best of our knowledge, nowhere has this common human behavioral tendency been 
incorporated into the investment decision making process to analyze the optimal asset allocation of a pension 
fund. It is therefore in this area that this paper fills a void in the literature. 
Generally speaking, the concept of regret, developed by Bell, Loomes and Sugden (1982), is intuitive and 
proposes a normative theory of choice under uncertainty that explains many observed violations of the axioms 
upon which the traditional expected utility theory is built. Regret is a cognitively mediated emotion of pain and 
anger when people observe ex-poste that they took a bad decision ex-ante and could have taken an alternative 
decision with a better outcome. In capital markets, people experience regret when their investments give a worse 
 
 
performance than an alternative investment they could have easily chosen a priori. This, for instance, is in 
contrast with disappointment, which is experienced when a negative outcome happens relative to prior 
expectations. Regret, which is a powerful negative emotion, is strongly associated with a feeling of responsibility 
for a choice made and is known to influence decision-making under uncertainty. It involves the regret/rejoice that 
a person feels when he gets outcome 𝑥 instead of outcome 𝑦. The theory assumes people are rational but base 
their decisions not only on expected payoffs or utility but also on expected regret, so that they try to anticipate 
future regret and consistently incorporate it into their investment decision making process. The incorporation of 
regret yields a modified utility and people reach their investment decisions by maximizing the expected value of 
this modified utility. This makes regret theory suitable for analyzing the optimal asset allocation of a pension 
fund.    
The anticipation of future regret is so strong that it forces even Harry Markowitz to relook his very own Nobel 
winning asset allocation theory when confronted with a financial decision on his pension plan. His quote: ‘I 
should have computed the historical covariance of the asset classes and drawn an efficient frontier. Instead I 
visualized my grief if the stock market went way up and I wasn’t in it—or if it went way down and I was 
completely in it. My intention was to minimize future regret, so I split my pension scheme contributions 50-50 
between bonds and equities.’ ‘Harry Markowitz, as quoted in Zweig (1998), America’s top pension fund’, 
Money, 27, page 114. This gives further support and credibility to the claim that regret does influence optimal 
investment decision of a pension fund. Anticipation of future experience of regret may lead individuals to make 
certain decisions that contrast with expected utility paradigm. This assertion will be investigated in the context of 
the optimal asset allocation of a pension fund in this paper.  
Meanwhile, unlike other fund managers, the case of pension funds requires the introduction of two 
characteristics: (i) the different behaviors of the managed funds during the accumulation (Ac) and decumulation 
(Dc) phases, and (ii) mortality risk. In addition, we must take cognizance of regret risk because we aim to work in 
a regret theoretic framework. So, this paper considers three dimensions of risk: traditional risk (volatility of final 
wealth), regret risk and mortality risk. To the best of our knowledge, no work on optimal asset allocation has 
simultaneously considered these risks. The only work, at least to our knowledge, which considers these risks in 
asset allocation theory, does not consider them simultaneously. For instance, Bajeux-Besnainou and Jordan 
(2001) consider only volatility risk, Michenaud and Solnik (2008) consider volatility risk and regret risk and 
Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2007) consider volatility risk and mortality risk. While the intuition of 
applying regret theory to asset allocation is not new, this is the first time that a formal regret theoretic approach is 
applied to the optimal asset allocation of a pension fund facing the aforementioned risks.  
As we have motivated above, regret is a major factor when making investment choices because institutional 
investors, more often than not, care about their choices relative to other strategies they could have employed. 
Although evidence favoring the influence of regret on decision-making exists instinctively, it is surprising that 
the theory has caught only little attention in the field of finance. In the few available studies, Muermann, Mitchell 
and Volkman (2006) apply regret theory to asset allocation in defined contribution pension schemes. They find 
that an investor who takes regret into account will hold more risky assets (stocks) when the equity premium is 
 
 
low but less risky assets when the equity premium is high. Braun and Muermann (2003) apply regret theory to 
demand for insurance. Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2005) apply a pseudo regret theory to asset pricing. Heybati, 
Rahnamay and Moosavi (2011) apply regret theory to portfolio optimization. Michenaud and Solnik (2008) study 
currency hedging techniques for foreign assets in a regret theoretic framework and derive some interesting 
implications for long and short hedging positions when a foreign currency appreciates or depreciates ex-post. 
However, all these models offer approximate explicit investment rules outside the context of a pension fund.  
In this paper, instead, we provide explicit optimal solutions for investment rules within the context of a pension 
fund which manages employees’ contributions towards retirement. Our methodology allows the derivation of 
approximate closed-form solutions for optimal investment choices available to a pension fund. In particular, 
during the active years of the employees, the fund wealth increases because of the contributions that the 
employees make towards retirement while, after retirement, the fund wealth decreases because of the pension 
payments that the pension fund makes to the retired employees.  Following Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet 
(2007), we suppose that a representative employee has no other choice at the retirement date than to receive a 
pension until the death time 𝜏, which is assumed to be a random variable. The pension fund then maximizes the 
expected modified utility of its final wealth, in anticipation of future regret.  In our model, the contribution and 
pension rates are constant and linked by a feasibility condition that guarantees the convenience of both the 
pension fund and the representative employee to amicably enter the pension contract. We argue why this 
feasibility condition must hold and derive its approximate closed-form expression under the assumption that the 
death time 𝜏 follows a log-logistic distribution. We emphasize that our result is quite different from the closed-
form expressions obtained under the assumption of both a Gompertz-Makeham and a Weibull distributed death 
time 𝜏 as in Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003, 2007). We also remark that the motivation for our choice 
of distribution for the death time 𝜏 stems from the fact that death-survival analyses for a random death time are 
best done under the assumption of a log-logistic distribution.  
Furthermore, we consider that a pension fund does not only manage retirement funds preretirement when 
contributions towards future pensions are made, but also manages the remaining wealth postretirement when 
pensions are being paid. Therefore, since management of the remaining wealth postretirement is also the duty of 
a pension fund, we set up the required optimization problem for the optimal asset allocation during the entire 
life of the representative subscriber in such a way that the final date of the optimization problem coincides with 
the death time of the subscriber. After solving this optimization problem in a regret theoretic framework, we 
find that the optimal portfolio compositions of the pension fund are identical during the accumulation and 
decumulation phases. In particular, we show that the amount of wealth invested in the risky-asset class increases 
through time during the accumulation phase and also increases through time after the retirement date, during the 
decumulation phase. We claim that this behavior is borne out of regret aversion. Regret averse pension funds 
would increasingly retain their positions in the risky-asset class for fear of the potential regret of missing out on 
any boom or upside in the risky-asset market.  
 
 
 
To summarize, in addition to other important results, our major contribution in this paper is systematic. We 
integrate regret into a well-defined objective function and this allows us to derive optimal investment strategies 
that reflect the risk and regret aversion of a pension fund. We find that the optimal asset allocation must be 
congruent in both phases if and only if the pension fund is upside regret averse. In particular, our results suggest 
that allocation to risky assets must increase through time in both accumulation and decumulation phases, so that 
the pension fund can realize large gains from the upside potential of the risky-asset market, thereby maximizing 
final wealth and limiting the feeling of regret ex-post. Although decisions in both phases are congruent, we find 
that the optimal asset allocation generally depends on wealth levels. This evidence implies that separate 
management of the accumulation and decumulation phases of a pension fund decreases available wealth levels 
and is not a robust strategy.  
  The rest of the paper flows as follows. Section 2 explains some important concepts that will aid the 
understanding of other ideas in subsequent sections, presents and discusses the financial model, and elaborates 
on the computation of feasibility condition on contribution and pension rates when the death time 𝜏 follows a 
log-logistic distribution. Section 3 presents the regret theoretic framework for the pension fund maximization 
problem, discusses regret theory and its importance for decision making under uncertainty and describes our 
modeling framework. Section 4 develops the objective function, applies regret theory to a pension fund which 
seeks to maximize its expected modified utility of final wealth, and computes the optimal allocation rule. 
Section 5 discusses the theoretical results in relation to the effective management of a pension fund and 
concludes with directions for future research. 
2. The Financial Markets Pension Fund Model 
We follow Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado (1997) and Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2007) and consider 
a financial market with one risky-asset class (common stock) and one riskless-asset class (T-bills) having rates 
of return 𝑑𝑆
𝑆
 and 𝑑𝐺
𝐺
 respectively, and where 𝑟 is the short term interest rate. If we assume also that dividend 
yield 𝛿 on common stocks influences returns on risky-asset class, then the joint price process follows 
{
 
 
 
                           
𝑑𝑆
𝑆
= 𝜇𝑆𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑆𝑑𝑧𝑆,     𝑆(𝑡0) = 𝑆0
        
𝑑𝐺
𝐺
= 𝑟𝑑𝑡,     𝐺(𝑡0) = 𝐺0
𝑑𝑟 = 𝜇𝑟𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑟𝑑𝑧𝑟
𝑑𝛿 = 𝜇𝛿𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝛿𝑑𝑧𝛿
                                                          (1)    
where the parameters μi, σi (i = r, δ, S) are at most functions of the variables r, δ, S, and 𝑑𝑧𝑖 are increments due 
to Weiner process. 𝑆0 and  𝐺0 are deterministic, positive and represent the initial prices of the risky and riskless-
asset classes respectively, while S and 𝐺 are their prices at time  𝑡 > 0. It should be noted that the dependence of 
the return 𝑑𝑆
𝑆
 on 𝑟 and 𝛿 is completely straightforward. Indeed,  𝑑𝑆
𝑆
 depends on 𝑟 and 𝛿 through the dependence of 
at least one of 𝜇𝑆 and 𝜎𝑆 on at most r, δ, S. This process may be estimated and tested statistically to ascertain the 
level of statistical significance of the effect of the state variables on stock returns, but that is not the focus of this 
paper. 
 
 
2.1.1 The Contributions and Pensions Payments 
If 𝑈(𝑡) denotes the total amount of contributions to the fund and 𝑉(𝑡) denotes the total amount of pensions paid 
by the fund, then 𝑈(𝑡) and 𝑉(𝑡) follow the ordinary linear differential equations 
𝑑𝑈(𝑡) = 𝑢𝑑𝑡,  𝑡0 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑇                                                                       (2𝑎) 
𝑑𝑉(𝑡) = 𝑣𝑑𝑡, 𝑇 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝜏                                                                          (2𝑏) 
where 𝑢 > 0 and 𝑣 > 0 are constant and do not vary with time. The pensions are paid until the death time of the 
subscriber and do not depend on the investment performance of the fund. 
2.1.2 The Feasibility Condition 
This is the condition that has to be satisfied before the subscriber and pension fund enter a pension contract in 
the first place. For this reason, the pension fund cannot freely dictate the contributions and pensions while the 
subscriber cannot solely dictate the pensions. The contributions and pensions cannot be chosen separately. The 
subscriber and the pension fund have to reach an agreement on the contributions and pensions simultaneously. 
When the subscriber enters the fund, he anticipates that the expected present value of all pensions cannot be 
lower than the expected present value of all contributions. Similarly, the pension fund formalizes the contract 
with the subscriber when it is convinced that the expected present value of all pensions cannot be more than the 
expected present value of all contributions. 
Money enters and leaves the pension fund according to the rate 
𝑚(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑈(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
𝕀𝑡<𝑇 −
𝑑𝑉(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
𝕀𝑡≥𝑇                                                                 (3𝑎) 
or 
𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇 − 𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇), 
where  
𝕀𝑡<𝑇 = {
1, if  𝑡 < 𝑇
0, if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇
 
If 𝑢 represents the constant contribution rate to the pension fund and 𝑣 represents the constant pension rate paid 
to a representative subscriber, then the feasibility condition holds for the pair (𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑢 > 0 and 𝑣 > 0 if 
𝔼 [∫𝑚(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] = 0, and the resulting expression for the feasibility condition is 
𝑢
𝑣
= −1 +
1 − 𝔼[𝑒−𝑟𝜏]
1 − 𝔼[𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇] − 𝑒𝑟𝑇ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇)
,                                                (3𝑏) 
where 𝜏 is the random death time. The proof is in Appendix 1 and the computation of the closed form 
approximations for the feasibility condition is in Appendix 2. 
 
 
3. Pension Fund Maximization Problem in a Regret Theoretic Framework 
In this section we approach the problem of a pension fund from a regret/rejoicing point of view. Since pension 
funds are largely connected with collecting, pooling and investing funds contributed by sponsors and 
beneficiaries in order to provide means for the beneficiaries to accumulate savings over their active working 
years so as to finance their consumption needs in retirement, we shall assume that the main problem of a 
pension fund is to maximize the expected modified utility of its final wealth at the death time of its subscribers.  
Contrary to the traditional choiceless utility function which is defined on outcomes of actual investment choices 
that a pension fund makes, the modified utility function does not only consider outcomes of actual investment 
choices, but it also includes a comparison of these outcomes with the outcomes of other investment choices that 
a pension fund could have made, but has not made. This makes it possible to incorporate regret into the 
modified utility function for the purpose of decision making. Regret-conscious pension funds do not only care 
about the expected return and volatility of their invested funds, but they also care about the deviations of the 
outcomes of their actual choices from the outcomes of their forgone choices. So, they face both volatility risk 
and regret risk. Volatility risk is linked to deviations of the invested fund’s return from its expected value. 
Regret risk is the risk that the pension funds are going to experience a feeling of regret in the future. That is, the 
risk that the outcomes of their actual investment choices will be worse than the outcomes of their forgone 
investment choices. There is also mortality risk, which is the risk of death of a subscriber and it enters the 
problem through the feasibility condition. 
In our work, we suppose that a pension fund can make two choices. The first is to invest/allocate a strictly 
positive amount 0 < 𝛼 < 1 to a risky-asset class and the remaining to a riskless-asset class while the second is 
to allocate nothing 𝛼 = 0 to the risky-asset class and allocate all to the riskless-asset class. We suppose that the 
pension fund is unsure of the performance of the risky-asset class, but always knows beforehand the 
performance of the riskless-asset class, so that this performance serves as a benchmark with which the pension 
fund compares the outcome of its actual investment strategy. The pension fund is assumed to experience a 
feeling of regret or rejoicing on the outcome of its choice. If we suppose that the pension fund makes or prefers 
the first choice (of taking a huge position in the risky-asset class) knowing full well that it may later regret its 
action or decision if it so happens that the outcome (performance) of the second choice (of taking no position in 
the risky-asset class) turns out much better than the outcome of his first choice, how would its optimal 
allocation choice/decision be today in order to maximize the expected modified utility of its final wealth, 
improve its feeling of rejoicing and lessen its feeling of regret that may occur in the future/ex-post after it has 
exited it position to evaluate its proceeds? This is one of the questions we shall answer in this part of our 
research.  
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 The Maximization Problem Setup 
As we have motivated in the previous section, regret theory rests on two fundamental assumptions. The 
first is that agents experience the sensations of regret and rejoicing, and the second is that agents try to 
anticipate and take account of these ex-post sensations when making ex-ante decisions under 
uncertainty. The modified utility function is therefore defined over the ex-post (final) outcomes of 
choices and rational investors would make choices ex-ante by maximizing the expected value of this 
modified utility. This allows agents to take the anticipation of regret into account in an axiomatic 
fashion. The modified utility function is not only defined over the outcome of the choice an agent 
makes, but it also includes a comparison with the outcome of another choice that could have been made 
in the same state of the world.    
 
If we define the expected value of the modified utility of a rational regret averse agent faced with two 
choices by 
                                            𝔼(𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦)) = 𝔼 (𝑈(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑈(𝑥) − 𝑈(𝑦)))                                (4𝑎)    
 
then the agent will seek to make a choice ex-ante that will give a final outcome 𝑥 which will maximize 
his expected modified utility, i.e. 
 
                                                           max
                  𝑥
𝔼(𝜓(𝑥, 𝑦)) = ∇                                                                  (4b)    
with  ∇= max
𝑥
𝔼(𝑈(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑈(𝑥) − 𝑈(𝑦))). 
 
It is important to note that if agents experience no regret or rejoicing at all, or if the function 𝑓 is linear, 
then the above formulation collapses to the conventional expected utility paradigm. 
 
Now that we have discussed the relevant aspects of regret theory that will aid our work on pension 
funds, we will proceed to how we can apply it in a pension fund context. Therefore, in what follows, we 
shall study the investment behavior of a pension fund in a regret theoretic framework. 
 
3.1.2  The Managed Wealth of the Pension Fund 
In the preceding section, we stated that the pension fund is assumed to have two choices—either it 
invests a strictly positive amount in the risky-asset class or it invests nothing in the risky-asset class. 
We further suppose that the pension fund does not prefer the choice of taking no position in the risky-
asset class. This is the choice or decision of the pension fund. If 𝜃(𝑡) represents the number of units of 
the risky-asset class and ∅(𝑡) represents the number of units of the riskless-asset class, then the 
apportioned wealth to the risky-asset class is 𝜃(𝑡)𝑆(𝑡) and the allotted wealth to the riskless-asst class 
is ∅(𝑡)𝐺(𝑡). Therefore, the total wealth process 𝑊(𝑡) of the pension fund, which we shall call the 
outcome of its choice of taking a positive position in the risky-asset class, evolves according to 
 
 
𝑊(𝑡) = 𝜃(𝑡)𝑆(𝑡) + ∅(𝑡)𝐺(𝑡)                                                                          (5𝑎) 
The associated stochastic differential equation is  
𝑑𝑊 = 𝜃𝑑𝑆 + ∅𝑑𝐺 + (𝑆 + 𝑑𝑆)𝑑𝜃 + 𝐺𝑑∅                                                   (5𝑏) 
Introducing the self-financing condition suggests that changes in portfolio composition are only due to 
variations in the prices of assets constituting the portfolio. Therefore, the term  (𝑆 + 𝑑𝑆)𝑑𝜃 + 𝐺𝑑∅ should 
normally be nonexistent or zero. However, since we are considering the case of a pension fund, then, without 
any loss of generality, we can argue that the self financing condition ensures that the additional term (𝑆 +
𝑑𝑆)𝑑𝜃 + 𝐺𝑑∅ comes from the contributions 𝑢 made by the subscriber during the accumulation phase and it is 
used to finance the pension payments 𝑣 during the decumulation period. Accordingly, therefore,  
(𝑆 + 𝑑𝑆)𝑑𝜃 + 𝐺𝑑∅ = 𝑚𝑑𝑡                                                                             (6𝑎) 
where 𝑚 is the rate at which money enters and leaves the fund, and so 
𝑑𝑊 = (𝑊𝑟 + ɸ(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟) +𝑚)𝑑𝑡 + ɸ𝜎𝑆𝑑𝑧𝑆                                                  (6𝑏) 
where ɸ = 𝜃𝑆 = 𝛼𝑊 is the amount of wealth apportioned to the risky-asset class, 𝑑𝑆 = 𝑆(𝜇𝑆𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑆𝑑𝑧𝑆) and 
𝑑𝐺 = 𝐺𝑟𝑑𝑡 represent the price process for the risky-asset class and the riskless-asset class respectively. 
Now, since we want to perform the analysis of a pension fund in a regret theoretic framework, we will not only 
consider the outcome of the decision/choice made by the pension fund, but we shall also consider the outcome 
of another choice that the pension fund could have made. In particular, we consider a case in which the pension 
fund could have made a choice of taking no position in the risky-asset class, i.e. investing solely in the riskless-
asset class. The wealth process or outcome of such a choice/decision would be  
𝑊𝑜(𝑡) = ∅(𝑡)𝐺(𝑡)                                                                         (7𝑎) 
and its associated stochastic differential equation would be  
𝑑𝑊𝑜 = ∅𝑑𝐺 + 𝐺𝑑∅                                                                       (7𝑏) 
 
Self-financing condition would then imply that 
𝐺𝑑∅ = 𝑚𝑑𝑡                                                                                        (8𝑎) 
where 𝑚 is as before, and so 
   𝑑𝑊𝑜 = (𝑊𝑜𝑟 + 𝑚)𝑑𝑡                                                                      (8𝑏) 
Equations (5a) –8(b) explicitly show the outcome of the actual investment choice made by the pension fund as 
well as the outcome of a forgone investment choice that the pension fund could have made. In what follows, we 
will now proceed and write down the objective function of the pension fund in a regret theoretic framework. 
 
 
 
4  The Objective Function of the Pension Fund 
The objective of the pension fund is to maximize the expected modified utility of its final wealth/final outcome 
at the death time 𝜏 of its subscriber, under the assumption that the pension fund anticipates to experience a 
feeling of regret if the outcome of its investment choice is less than the outcome of a forgone investment choice 
and that the pension fund takes this feeling into account when making its decision under uncertainty with the 
sole aim of curtailing future regrets. The forgone investment choice is taken as a full investment in the riskless-
asset class. Following (4a), we can write the modified utility function of the pension fund as  
         𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜) = (𝑈(𝑊)+ 𝑓(𝑈(𝑊) − 𝑈(𝑊𝑜)))
= (𝑈(𝜃𝑆 + ∅𝐺) + 𝑓 (𝑈(?̂?𝑆 + ∅𝐺) − 𝑈(∅𝐺)))                                                      (9𝑎)     
Thus, the objective function of the pension fund is  
                    max
                  ɸ
𝔼𝑡0
𝜏 ( 𝜓(𝑊(𝜏),𝑊𝑜(𝜏))) = ∇                                                            (9b)      
where  
∇= max
ɸ
𝔼𝑡0
𝜏 ( 𝑈(𝜃𝑆 + ∅𝐺) + 𝑓 (𝑈(?̂?𝑆 + ∅𝐺) − 𝑈(∅𝐺))) 
i.e. finding the right allocation to the risky-asset class that will help maximize the expected modified utility of 
the pension fund’s final wealth.  Following [4] and [9], we assume the death time 𝜏 is independent of all other 
sources of risk. With this assumption, we can rewrite the above expected value as  
𝔼𝑡0
𝜏 ( 𝜓(𝑊(𝜏),𝑊𝑜(𝜏))) = 𝔼𝑡0 [∫ 𝑔(𝑡)𝜓(𝑊(𝑡),𝑊
𝑜(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡0
]                                    (10) 
where 𝑔(𝑡) = 𝑛(𝑡)𝑝𝑡0𝑒
−𝜌(𝑡−𝑡0) is the actuarial discount factor, 𝑛(𝑡) is the instantaneous mortality rate (known 
as mortality force), 𝑝𝑡0 is the survival probability and 𝜌 is the positive intertemporal discount rate [4].  
Now, we need to define the utility function 𝑈(∗) and the regret function 𝑓(∗) that we shall use in the course of 
our analysis. The one most widely used utility function in the literature is the constant relative risk aversion 
utility function of the form 𝑈(𝑋) = 𝑋
1−𝜗
1−𝜗
 with 1 − 𝜗 < 1. Here, we shall use a slight modification of this utility 
function. Now, we know that a pension function derives utility from its wealth after all contributions have been 
made and pensions have been paid. Therefore, if we let 𝑀(𝑡) represent all contributions and payments up to the 
present time, where 𝑀(𝑡) can be written as [4] 
𝑀(𝑡) = ∫𝑚(𝑠)𝑒−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
𝑡0
 
then the pension fund will derive some utility from 𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡), and so the utility function must be defined on 
this argument, i.e. 𝑈(𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡)). This is our slight modification of the utility function. For the regret 
 
 
function 𝑓(∗), we assume that it is of the form 𝑓(𝑌) = (𝑌 + 𝑎)𝜌,  with 𝑎 > 0 and 𝜌 > 0, both of which are 
positive and less than 1 [1]. Accordingly, therefore, the modified utility function can be written as  
𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜) =
(𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
1 − 𝜗
+ (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌
        (11) 
where all variables are as previously defined.  
4.1  The Optimization Problem of the Pension Fund 
The previous sections set the ground for formulating the optimization problem of the pension fund. As we 
assume that the pension fund seeks to maximize the expected modified utility of its terminal wealth after all 
contributions have been made and pensions have been made, we write the regret theoretic asset allocation 
problem as 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
max
ɸ
𝔼𝑡0 [∫ 𝑔(𝑡) (
(𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
1 − 𝜗
+ (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌
)  𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡0
]
                                                          𝑑ɸ = (𝑊𝑟 + ɸ(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟) +𝑚)𝑑𝑡 + ɸ𝜎𝑆𝑑𝑧𝑆
                   𝑑𝑊𝑜 = (𝑊𝑜𝑟 + 𝑚)𝑑𝑡
 𝑊(𝑡0) = 𝑊0
     𝑊𝑜(𝑡0) = 𝑊0
𝑜
   (12) 
where 𝑔(𝑡) is the actuarial discount factor [4].  
Following [4], let us define the function  
{𝑉(𝑡,𝑊,𝑊
0,ɸ) = [∫𝑔(𝑠) (
(𝑊(𝑠) −𝑀(𝑠))
1−𝜗
1 − 𝜗
+ (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑠) −𝑀(𝑠))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑠) −𝑀(𝑠))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌
)𝑑𝑠
∞
𝑡
] 
.
 
then the value function can be written as 
𝐽(𝑡,𝑊,𝑊0) = max
ɸ
 𝑉(𝑡,𝑊,𝑊0, ɸ) 
This value function satisfies the HJB Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation 
𝐽𝑡 +max
ɸ
[
 
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 𝑔(𝑡) (
(𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
1 − 𝜗
+ (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌
)
+
𝐽𝑊(𝑊𝑟 + ɸ(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟) +𝑚) +
1
2
𝐽𝑊𝑊ɸ
2𝜎𝑆
2 + 𝐽𝑊0(𝑊
𝑜𝑟 + 𝑚) ]
 
 
 
 
 
= 0  
From this equation, the first order condition for the maximization yields 
[
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 
𝑔(𝑡)(𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
−𝜗
(1 + 𝜌 (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌−1
)
+
𝐽𝑊𝜇𝑆 + 𝐽𝑊𝑊𝜎𝑆
2ɸ ]
 
 
 
 
= 0 
 
 
⇒ ɸ∗ = −
ℙ
𝐽𝑊𝑊𝜎𝑆
2                                                                    (13) 
where the subscripts indicate the partial derivatives with respect to 𝐽 and  
ℙ =
{
 
 𝑔(𝑡)(𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
−𝜗
(1 + 𝜌 (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌−1
)
+
𝐽𝑊𝜇𝑆
 
The first order conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality because the modified utility is concave in 
𝑊 and hence in ɸ, since 𝑊 is a function of ɸ. In fact, under all the suitably stated conditions that must hold for 
the optimization problem of the pension fund, the modified utility function, and hence the value function, is 
increasing and concave in 𝑊. The proof is given in Appendix 3. 
After substituting the expression of ɸ∗, we obtain the resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation 
[
 
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 𝐽𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑡) (
(𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
1 − 𝜗
+ (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡)−𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡)−𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌
)
+
𝐽
𝑊
(𝑊𝑟 +𝑚) +
ℵ
𝐽𝑊𝑊𝜎𝑆
2 (
1
2
ℵ − 𝐽𝑊(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟)) + 𝐽𝑊0(𝑊
𝑜𝑟 +𝑚)
]
 
 
 
 
 
= 0 
For the value function, we can try the substitution 𝐽(𝑡,𝑊,𝑊0) = ℎ(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡) 𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜), where ℎ(𝑡) is a function 
that needs to be determined [4].  From this substitution, we have  
𝐽𝑡 = 𝑔(𝑡)𝜓(𝑊,𝑊
𝑜) 
𝜕ℎ(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
+  ℎ(𝑡)𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜)
𝜕𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
+ ℎ(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡) 
𝜕𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜)
𝜕𝑡
 
𝐽𝑊 = ℎ(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜)
𝜕𝑊
,   𝐽𝑊𝑊 = ℎ(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕
𝜕𝑊
𝜕𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜)
𝜕𝑊
, 𝐽𝑊𝑜 = ℎ(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕𝜓(𝑊,𝑊𝑜)
𝜕𝑊𝑜
  
Plugging these expressions into the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation and simplifying terms, we obtain that 
ℎ(𝑡) satisfies 
𝜕ℎ(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
+ (
1
𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕𝑔(𝑡)
𝜕𝑡
+ 𝑟 (1 +
1
2𝜎𝑆
2
𝑟
(1 − 𝜗)(𝜌 − 1)
𝑔(𝑡)) +
1
2𝜎𝑆
2
𝑔(𝑡)
ℎ(𝑡)
1
(𝜌 − 1)
) ℎ(𝑡) + 𝐴(𝑊,𝑊𝑜) = 0 
where 
𝐴(𝑊,𝑊𝑜) =
1
2
ℵ2
𝐽𝑊𝑊𝜎𝑆
2 −
𝐽𝑊
𝐽𝑊𝑊
ℵ(𝜇𝑆 − 𝑟)
𝜎𝑆
2  
The precise form of the function ℎ(𝑡) is not important for computing the optimal portfolio composition of the 
pension fund since the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion index computed on 𝐽(𝑊,𝑊𝑜) does not depend on ℎ(𝑡). This 
makes it possible for us to obtain the composition of the optimal asset allocation of the pension fund. Thus, 
 
 
given a pair (𝑢, 𝑣) of constant contribution and pension rates satisfying the feasibility condition, the 
composition of the optimal asset allocation of a pension fund which maximizes the expected modified utility of 
its final wealth is given by  
ɸ∗ =
𝐸
(𝐿 − 𝐻)𝜎𝑆
2                                                                     (14) 
where 
{
 
 
 
             𝐸 = (
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆) [1 +
𝜌(𝜌−1)
1−𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)𝑀 + 𝑎𝜌(𝜌 − 1)]
𝐿 =   𝜗 [−1 +
𝜌(𝜌−1)
1−𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)𝑀 + 𝑎𝜌(𝜌 − 1)]
𝐻 = 𝜌(𝜌 − 1) (
1
𝑊𝜗
+
𝑀𝜗
𝑊𝜗+1
) [1 +
𝜌(𝜌−2)
1−𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 2)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)𝑀 + 𝑎𝜌(𝜌 − 2)]
 
Without any loss of generality, and for simplicity, we can disregard the last term (set 𝑎 to zero) in each 
of the above expressions, replace 𝑀 with its value and then break each expression into two parts to get 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             𝐸𝑢 = (
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆) [1 +
𝜌(𝜌 − 1)
1 − 𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)∫𝑢
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠]
𝐿𝑢 = 𝜗 [−1 +
𝜌(𝜌 − 1)
1 − 𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)∫𝑢
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠]
                 𝐻𝑢 = 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(
1
𝑊𝜗
+
𝜗
𝑊𝜗+1
∫𝑢
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠)
[
 
 
 
 
 1 +
𝜌(𝜌 − 2)
1 − 𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) +
𝜌(𝜌 − 2)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)(∫𝑢
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠)
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
ɸ𝑢
∗ =
𝐸𝑢
(𝐿 − 𝐻)𝜎𝑆
2                                                                       (14𝑎) 
and  
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐸𝑣 = (
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆) 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(𝑊
𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)∫𝑣(1 −
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇)𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠
𝐿𝑣 = 𝜗𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(𝑊
𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)∫𝑣(1 −
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇)𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠
𝐻𝑣 = 𝜌
2(1 − 𝜌)(𝜌 − 2)
𝜗
𝑊𝜗+1
(∫𝑣(1 −
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇)𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠)
2
(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)
 
               ɸ𝑣
∗ =
𝐸𝑣
(𝐿 − 𝐻)𝜎𝑆
2                                                              (14𝑏) 
so that  
ɸ∗ = ɸ𝑢
∗ + ɸ𝑣
∗  
where 𝑢 and 𝑣 are linked by the feasibility condition and 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑢 + 𝐿𝑣 and 𝐻 = 𝐻𝑢 +𝐻𝑣.  
 
 
The first set of equations depends explicitly on the contribution rate 𝑢 and the wealth level of the pension fund 
as a result of its actual investment choice, i.e. investing a positive amount in the risky- asset class. It also 
depends on the wealth level of a forgone investment choice, i.e. the investment choice that could have been 
made, which would involve taking no position in the risky-asset class. The wealth level of the forgone 
investment decision is a benchmark with which to compare the outcome or wealth level of the pension fund’s 
actual investment choice. The second set of equations also depends on the two wealth levels as well as on the 
pension rate 𝑣. Furthermore, the mortality risk 𝜏 enters the maximization problem through the link that exists 
between the contribution rate 𝑢  and the pension rate 𝑣 in the feasible condition derived in Appendix 1.  It is 
very pertinent to further stress that 𝑢 and 𝑣 must satisfy this feasibility condition as we have already 
demonstrated. As noted in [9], if this link between 𝑢 and 𝑣 is completely not considered through the feasibility 
condition, then the composition of the optimal asset allocation of a pension fund is independent of mortality 
risk. Such an optimal asset allocation strategy for a pension fund can produce very shallow and extremely 
restricted results in practice.  
A very important deduction from the two sets of equations is that the optimal allocation of the pension fund 
does explicitly depend on the wealth levels. This becomes evident since the equations themselves depend on the 
wealth levels and when we substitute the expressions of the equations into the composition of the optimal asset 
allocation of the pension fund, we get that it also depends on the wealth levels. From this, therefore, we can 
deduce that it is suboptimal for a pension fund to manage the accumulation phase, when contributions are made, 
and the decumulation phase, when pensions are paid, separately. Hence our model prohibits the pension fund 
from outsourcing any of the phases of the pension fund management to a second or third party. This means that 
the idea of outsourcing, commonly employed by large pension funds in emerging economies, is not effective 
and does not conform to an optimal strategy in a regret theoretic framework. Ideally, a firm should commit the 
entire management of its employees’ retirement plan to the same pension fund and the pension fund itself must 
not outsource any of the phases of the pension management process. If it does, its action will be suboptimal and 
may have undesirable consequences. We now investigate what happens at the two phases involved in the 
management of a pension fund – accumulation and decumulation phases.  
4.1.1 Accumulation Phase 
When 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇, the pension fund is in the accumulation phase and the optimal allocation strategy in this phase can 
be written as  
 𝐸𝑢 = (
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆)(1 +
𝜌(𝜌 − 1)
1 − 𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)
𝑢
𝑟
(𝑒𝑟𝑡 − 1)) 
𝐿𝑢 = 𝜗 (−1 +
𝜌(𝜌 − 1)
1 − 𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 1)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)
𝑢
𝑟
(𝑒𝑟𝑡 − 1)) 
𝐻𝑢 = 𝜌(𝜌 − 1) (
1
𝑊𝜗
+
𝑢
𝑟
𝜗
𝑊𝜗+1
(𝑒𝑟𝑡 − 1))(1 +
𝜌(𝜌 − 2)
1 − 𝜗
(𝑊1−𝜗 −𝑊𝑜1−𝜗) + 𝜌(𝜌 − 2)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)
𝑢
𝑟
(𝑒𝑟𝑡 − 1)) 
 
 
ɸ𝑢
∗ =
𝐸𝑢
(𝐿 − 𝐻)𝜎𝑆
2  and ɸ𝑣
∗ = 0 since 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 ⇒  (∫𝑣(1 −
𝑡
0
𝕀𝑡<𝑇)𝑒
−𝑟(𝑠−𝑡)𝑑𝑠) = 0 
We first recall that 𝜇𝑆 can be positive, negative or zero and (
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆) >0 since 𝑔 is a discount factor whose 
value is positive and less than 1. Suppose now that the pension fund is not regret averse. During the 
accumulation phase, and in the absence of regret aversion, i.e. 𝜌=0, the optimal allocation to the risky-asset 
class assumes negative values and thus contains a decreasing proportion of the risky-asset class with respect to 
time. This means that, in the absence of regret aversion, the optimal allocation to risky assets during the 
accumulation phase decreases through time in order for the pension fund to meet payments of future pensions to 
its subscribers. This property is not difficult to check. For instance, when we set the regret coefficient to zero 
and differentiate the resulting expression with respect to time, we obtain  
𝑑ɸ𝑢
∗
𝑑𝑡
=
1
𝑔2
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝑡
< 0 ∀ 
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝑡
< 0 
as previously noted. The graphical illustration is shown as below 
                                                        
Figure 4: Behavior of the optimal asset allocation with time 
This behavior during the accumulation phase substantiates the implications of the results documented in 
Battocio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003, 2007). However, in the presence of regret, as in our case, the conclusion 
is not always the same. Indeed, we notice that, depending on the level of aversion and the choice of the 
underlying variables, the optimal asset allocation to the risky-asset class takes positive values and thus contains 
a non-decreasing proportion of the risky-asset class with regard to time. This means that, in the presence of 
regret aversion, regret averse pension funds have an optimal risky-asset allocation strategy that increases 
through time during the accumulation phase. In our view, the intuition behind this is pragmatically clear. Regret 
averse pension funds invest more in risky assets as time passes so as not to miss the upside potential of the 
risky-asset market, especially in bullish times. Thus a regret averse pension fund invests an increasing amount 
of wealth in the risky asset class. This is done in order to have a higher return on the managed wealth and on the 
contributions made by the subscribers.  
ɸ
* 
time, t
 
 
4.1.2 Decumulation Phase 
When 𝑡 > 𝑇, the pension fund is in the decumulation phase and the optimal asset allocation strategy in this 
phase can be written as  
𝐸𝑣 =
𝑣
𝑟
(
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆) 𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(𝑊
𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)(𝑒𝑟(𝑡−𝑇) − 1) 
                                             𝐿𝑣 =
𝑣
𝑟
𝜗𝜌(1 − 𝜌)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)(𝑒𝑟(𝑡−𝑇) − 1) 
                                             𝐻𝑣 = (
𝑣
𝑟
)
2
𝜌(1 − 𝜌)
𝜗
𝑊𝜗+1
(𝑒𝑟(𝑡−𝑇) − 1) (𝜌(𝜌 − 2)(𝑊𝑜−𝜗 −𝑊−𝜗)(𝑒𝑟(𝑡−𝑇) − 1)) 
                                             ɸ𝑣
∗ =
(
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆)
(𝜗 −
𝑣
𝑟 𝜌
(𝜌 − 2)
𝜗
𝑊𝜗+1
(𝑒𝑟(𝑡−𝑇) − 1))𝜎𝑆
2
 
During the decumulation phase, and in the absence of regret aversion, i.e. 𝜌=0, the optimal allocation to the 
risky-asset class takes positive values and therefore increases through time when the actuarial discount factor 
decreases with time. This property is very easy to check. Indeed, if we set the coefficient of regret aversion to 
zero, we obtain 
ɸ𝑣
∗ =
(
1
𝑔(𝑡)
+ 𝜇𝑆)
𝜗
> 0 
which shows that the risky-asset class takes positive values. Furthermore, if we take the time derivative of this 
expression, we see that 
𝑑ɸ𝑣
∗
𝑑𝑡
=
−1
𝑔2
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝑡
> 0 ∀ 
𝑑𝑔
𝑑𝑡
< 0 
which shows that the optimal allocation to the risky-asset class increases through time. Again, this conforms to 
the deductions made in Battocio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003, 2007). This behavior is depicted below.  
                                                             
Figure 5: Behavior of the optimal asset allocation with time 
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In the presence of regret, as in our case, the situation is somewhat similar. Indeed, for all admissible levels of 
regret aversion, the optimal allocation to the risky-asset class takes only positive values during the decumulation 
phase and increases through time. The optimal allocation is skewed in favor of the risky-asset class in the 
decumulation phase. In fact when the retirement date 𝑇 is still far away, the pension fund can afford to invest in 
the risky-asset class because of the belief that the risky-asset class may provide a better opportunity for it to 
accumulate more wealth before the retirement date. This behavior is borne out of regret aversion. The pension 
fund is averse to regret because it does not want to experience the feeling of regret that comes when the risky-
asset appreciates over time and the pension fund does not have a high position in it. We recall from the 
formulation of our problem that the pension fund feels regret or rejoicing with respect to the risky-asset class. 
Therefore, if the pension fund anticipates an ex-post feeling of regret and factors this feeling into its decision 
making process, then to maximize its portfolio value, increase its final wealth level and minimize its future 
regret the pension fund’s optimal strategy would be to take an increasing position in the risky-asst class during 
both the accumulation and decumulation phases.  
We must emphasize that this result contrasts the behavior of a pension fund in the traditional expected utility 
(EU) framework. In the EU framework, the optimal allocation to risky assets decreases through time in the 
accumulation phase so that the pension fund would be able to make a sure and substantial pension payment in 
the decumulation phase, while the optimal asset allocation to risky assets increases through time in the 
decumulation phase. In our case, however, the allocation to the risky-asset class soars with time during both 
phases. In particular, this is so in the decumulation phase because after retirement and during the payment of 
pensions, the higher the number of pension installments paid, the fewer remaining pensions left to be paid, and 
as the death time approaches, the probability that the pension subscriber would die increases, so the pension 
fund can accept to take much risk with less feeling of regret ex-post. The pension fund can afford to invest more 
and more in the risky-asset class in order to have a high return on the received contributions from the 
subscribers (which are then reinvested for the purpose of growing the contributed funds) and on the total 
managed wealth. This behavior is borne out of regret. Regret aversion forces the pension fund to behave this 
way so as to minimize the feeling of regret that would occur if the risky-asset goes up and the pension fund is 
not there.  
When the pension fund starts paying pensions, the higher the number of pension installments paid, the lower the 
probability to pay another pension installment since the death probability increases through time. Thus, after the 
retirement date 𝑇 when 𝑡 increases, the pension fund can afford to invest increasingly in the risky-asset class 
because it has fewer pensions to pay and thus would deem it optimal to increase the allocation to risky assets 
because of the upside potential they are capable of generating. Thus, for a pension fund which seeks to 
maximize the expected modified utility of its final wealth, the optimal asset allocation rule is such that the 
amount allocated to risky-asset class increases through time during both phases— the accumulation phase and 
the decumulation phase.  
 
 
 
 
5 Conclusion  
Battocchio et al (2007) use the theory of expected utility-maximization, applied to the management of two 
phases of a pension fund, the accumulation and decumulation phases, to conclude that the optimal asset 
allocation to risky assets in both phases must be different—it must decrease through time in the accumulation 
phase and increase through time in the decumulation phase. Instead, in this paper, we have considered the 
problem of finding the optimal asset allocation of a pension fund in a regret theoretic framework. We 
incorporate regret into the decision making process of a pension fund and thus study the same problem in a 
regret theoretic framework. We focused on the composition of the optimal asset allocation strategy in the 
accumulation and decumulation phases of the pension fund management. The configuration of the financial 
market is such that there is a risky-asset class whose price follows a geometric Brownian motion, a riskless-
asset class paying a non trivial interest rate and the market is not necessarily complete. Furthermore, the pension 
fund is assumed to possess a power utility function and a regret/rejoice function which satisfies all the usual 
properties of a standard regret function. Our emphasis is on regret theory and we derive approximated closed 
form solutions for the pension fund management. We analyzed the optimal allocation problem during both the 
accumulation phase and the decumulation phase. We considered a random death time of the representative 
subscriber and assumed the death time follows a Log-logistic distribution. We then derive the feasibility 
condition connecting the contribution rate 𝑢, the pension rate 𝑣, and the random death time 𝜏 under the 
assumption that the contribution and pension rates are constant. This is a major area of contribution in this 
paper. There are three risk attributes entering our objective function. The first is the traditional volatility, the 
second is the regret risk, embedded in the regret function, and the third is the mortality risk that comes in 
through the feasibility condition.  
We showed that the optimal asset allocation for a regret averse pension fund in the accumulation phase is not 
different from the one in the decumulation phase. This is another major area of contribution in this paper. This 
particular result contrasts sharply with that obtained in the expected utility framework in which the optimal 
asset allocation during the accumulation phase is completely different from the optimal asset allocation in the 
decumulation phase. In expected utility framework particularly, the allocation to risky assets decreases with 
time during the accumulation phase so as to make it possible for the pension fund to guarantee the payment of 
pensions to the representative subscriber after retirement while, during the decumulation phase when pensions 
are paid, the optimal allocation to risky assets increases with time. Instead, in our case, in the regret theory 
framework, the optimal allocation to risky-asset class increases during both accumulation and decumulation 
phases. The intuition to support this behavior is that when pensions are paid, the probability of paying more 
pensions decreases as time passes because of the subscriber’s inevitable closeness to death after the retirement 
date. This makes it possible for the pension fund to invest the remaining available wealth in more and more 
risky assets and so the allocation to risky assets increases with time. The pension fund is confident enough to 
take higher positions in risky assets because of its reducing level of obligations and its desire to benefit from the 
upside potential of the risky-asset market. We also observe that the optimal asset allocation of the pension fund 
jointly depends on its global wealth levels in both the accumulation phase and the decumulation phase. 
Therefore, it is not optimal for a pension fund to manage the accumulation phase and decumulation phase 
 
 
separately. Outsourcing the management of just a phase of a pension fund is therefore not an optimal strategy. A 
pension fund that manages the accumulation phase should ideally manage the decumulation phase. 
Future research would be an extension of our model to cater to the optimal asset allocation rule of a pension 
fund that manages the retirement proceeds of immortal subscribers in a regret theoretic framework. Although 
humans are not immortal and so such an extension would be purely theoretical with very little practical 
implications and real life consequences, we believe the outcome would be inspiring to those theoretical analysts 
and researchers who are interested in immortality bias in survival analysis as regards the management of 
pension funds.   
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Appendix 1 
Derivation of the Feasibility Condition 
If 𝑢 represents the constant contribution rate to a pension fund and 𝑣 represents the constant pension 
rate paid to a subscriber, then the feasibility condition holds for the pair (𝑢, 𝑣), 𝑢 > 0 and 𝑣 > 0 if 
𝔼 [∫𝑚(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] = 0, and the resulting expression for the feasibility condition is 
𝑢
𝑣
= −1+
1 − 𝔼[𝑒−𝑟𝜏]
1 − 𝔼[𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇] − 𝑒𝑟𝑇ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇)
 
where 𝜏 is the random death time. 
Proof 
Given that 𝑇 is the retirement date: 
 When 𝑡 < 𝑇, we have 𝕀𝑡<𝑇 = 1 and 𝑚(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑈(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑢 > 0 ⇒ contributions are made, 
money enters the fund and so we are in the accumulation phase. 
 
 When 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇, we have 𝕀𝑡<𝑇 = 0 and 𝑚(𝑡) = −
𝑑𝑉(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= −𝑣 < 0 ⇒ pensions are paid, money 
leaves the fund and so we are in the decumulation phase. 
If we denote the expected present value of all pensions by 𝔼𝑃𝑉𝑃, where 
       𝔼𝑃𝑉𝑃 = 𝔼∫𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇)
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 
and the expected present value of all contributions by 𝔼𝑃𝑉𝐶, where  
𝔼𝑃𝑉𝐶 =  𝔼∫𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 
then from the point of view of the subscriber, 𝔼𝑃𝑉𝑃 ≥ 𝔼𝑃𝑉𝐶, i.e. 
𝐴: 𝔼∫𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇)
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 ≥ 𝔼∫𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 
and from the point of view of the pension fund, 𝔼𝑃𝑉𝑃 ≤ 𝔼𝑃𝑉𝐶, i. e 
 
 
𝐵: 𝔼∫𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇)
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝔼∫𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 
Accordingly, therefore, both parties reach an agreement when 𝐴 ∩ 𝐵 ≠ ∅, i. e.  
𝔼∫𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇)
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 ≥ 𝔼∫𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 ∩   𝔼∫𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇)
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 ≤ 𝔼∫𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 ≠ ∅ 
         ⇒ 𝔼∫𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 𝔼∫𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇)
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 
        ⇒ 𝔼∫(𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇 − 𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇))
𝜏
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡 = 0, i. e. 
𝔼 [∫𝑚(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] = 0, 
where  𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇 − 𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇),  𝑒−𝑟𝑡  is the discount factor and 𝜏 is the random death time of 
the subscriber. This is the feasibility condition that has to be satisfied before the subscriber and the 
pension fund can accept the pair (𝑢, 𝑣). It guarantees that neither the pension fund nor the subscriber 
feels cheated. 
We next prove  
𝑢
𝑣
= −1+
1 − 𝔼[𝑒−𝑟𝜏]
1 − 𝔼[𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇] − 𝑒𝑟𝑇ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇)
 
Eliminating 𝑚(𝑡) from 𝔼[∫ 𝑚(𝑡)𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡𝜏
0
] = 0 and 𝑚(𝑡) = 𝑢𝕀𝑡<𝑇 − 𝑣(1 − 𝕀𝑡<𝑇) yields 
                   
𝑢
 𝑣
=
𝔼[∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] − 𝔼[∫ 𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
]
𝔼[∫ 𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
]
 
𝑢
𝑣
=
𝔼[∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
]
𝔼[∫ 𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
]
− 1 
Now, since we can write 
∫𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
=
1
𝑟
−
𝑒−𝑟𝜏
𝑟
 
and  
 
 
∫𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
= {
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝜏
𝑟
 for 𝜏 < 𝑇
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟
 for 𝜏 ≥ 𝑇
 
then we have 
                               𝔼 [∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] =
1
𝑟
−
𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏)
𝑟
=
1
𝑟
(1 − 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏)) 
and  
                                                𝔼 [∫𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] = ∫
1 − 𝑒−𝑟𝜏
𝑟
𝑇
0
𝑓(𝜏) + ∫
1− 𝑒−𝑟𝑇
𝑟
𝑓(𝜏)
∞
𝑇
 
where 𝑓(𝜏) is the density of the random death time 𝜏. 
Complete integration by parts yields 
𝔼 [∫𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] =
1
𝑟
(ℙ(𝜏 < 𝑇) + ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇)) −
1
𝑟
∫𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝑓(𝜏)𝑑𝜏 −
1
𝑟
𝑇
0
𝑒−𝑟𝑇ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇) 
or  
𝔼 [∫ 𝕀𝑡<𝑇𝑒
−𝑟𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝜏
0
] =
1
𝑟
(1 − 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) − 𝑒
−𝑟𝑇ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇)) 
Thus 
𝑢
𝑣
= −1 +
(1 − 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏))
1 − 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) − 𝑒−𝑟𝑇ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇)
 
as required to prove. 
Remarks 
The proposition shows that pensions are proportional to contributions. This is exactly what is observed 
in practice; the higher the contributions towards retirement, the higher the pensions at retirement.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Computation of the Feasibility Condition 
Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003, 2007) assume death time 𝜏 follows a Gompertz-Makeham 
distribution and a Weibull distribution and they compute the feasibility condition based on these 
assumptions. Here, we explicitly compute the feasibility condition by supposing that the death time 𝜏 
follows a log-logistic distribution. Besides giving a concrete view of the feasibility condition, the log-
logistic distribution takes only positive arguments, provides a better characterization of the death time 
and is most widely used in death/survival analysis. These are some of its desirable properties which 
explain why we favor it in our work. 
The log-logistic distribution density function of the death time 𝜏 is given by 
𝑓(𝜏) =
𝛽
𝛼 (
𝜏
𝛼)
𝛽−1
[1 + (
𝜏
𝛼)
𝛽
]
2  where 𝜏 > 0, 𝛼 > 0, 𝛽 > 0 
𝛼 and 𝛽 are the scaling and shaping factor respectively. 
                                               
Figure 1: Log-logistic distribution of death time 𝜏 with 𝛼 = 1.7, 𝛽 = 1.3 
The expected time of death is given by 
∫ 𝜏𝑓(𝜏)𝑑𝜏 = 𝛼B (1 −
1
𝛽
, 1 +
1
𝛽
) = 𝛼𝛤 (1 −
1
𝛽
)𝛤 (1 +
1
𝛽
) , 𝛽 > 1 
∞
0
 
where B and 𝛤 are the Beta and Gamma functions respectively. The behavior of the expected death 
time is shown in Figure 2 where we have set 𝛼 ∈ [2, 10] and 𝛽 ∈ [1.10, 1.50]. We see that the 
expected time of death soars to roughly 100 years when the parameters take the set values above.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Expected time of death for the log-logistic distribution 
Before we compute the feasibility condition, we need to first obtain ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇), 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏) and 
𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) under our assumption of a log-logistic death time 𝜏 distribution.  
 ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇) 
The probability that the death time 𝜏 would occur on or after the obligatory retirement date 𝑇 is given 
by 
ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇) =
𝛽
𝛼
∫
(
𝜏
𝛼)
𝛽−1
[1 + (
𝜏
𝛼)
𝛽
]
2 𝑑𝜏
∞
𝑇
 
If we apply the change of variable 𝑢 = 1 + (𝜏
𝛼
)
𝛽
, where 𝑢 → 0 𝑎𝑠 𝜏 → ∞,we will obtain  
ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇) =
1
1 + (
𝑇
𝛼)
𝛽
 
We remark that if the retirement date is very far into the future, the probability of death time occurring 
after the retirement date tends to zero. This means that the death time is most likely to occur before the 
retirement date and thus there is a risk that the employee may die in active service before retirement. 
This explains why more countries are increasingly favoring earlier retirement dates. 
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  𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏)                                                                                                                              
This is the expected value of the discounting factor over the death time of the subscriber.  An 
advantage of the log-logic distribution is that it takes only positive death time, unlike a Normal 
distribution which can assume an undesirable negative death time. Considering this, we have 
𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏) =
𝛽
𝛼
∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝜏
∞
0
(
𝜏
𝛼)
𝛽−1
[1 + (
𝜏
𝛼)
𝛽
]
2 𝑑𝜏 = ∫ 𝑢
−2𝑒−𝑟𝛼(𝑢−1)
1
𝛽
∞
1
𝑑𝑢    
where we have used the change of variable 𝜏 = 𝛼(𝑢 − 1)
1
𝛽 . Since this integral does not admit an 
elementary algebraic solution, we may propose an approximation as in the Proposition  below. 
Proposition  
Under the assumption that  (𝑢 − 1)
1
𝛽 < 1 for 𝛽 > 0,  𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏) approximates to  
  𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏) ≅
β
rα
[(
1
rα
)
β−1
Γ(β) − 2 (
1
rα
)
2β−1
Γ(2β)]  
where  Γ is the complete gamma function defined as 
Γ(s) = ∫ ts−1
∞
0
e−tdt = (s − 1)! 
Proof                                                                                                                                                                                 
Set 𝑡 = 𝑟𝛼(𝑢 − 1)
1
𝛽  and use negative binomial theorem to expand [1 + ( 𝑡
𝑟𝛼
)
𝛽
]
−2
after which the 
result follows. 
 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) 
Computing 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇)  is akin to computing 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏) but with an added restriction that the death 
time must occur before the retirement date, i.e. given that the subscriber dies before the retirement 
date. Arguments similar to Proposition 2 give 
𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) ≅
𝛽
𝑟𝛼
[(
1
𝑟𝛼
)
𝛽−1
∫𝑡𝛽−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡 − 2 (
1
𝑟𝛼
)
2𝛽−1
𝑇
0
∫𝑡2𝛽−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
 ] 
If we define the lower incomplete gamma function as   
 
 
𝛾(𝑠, 𝑥) = ∫𝑡𝑠−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡 
𝑥
0
 
then we will have  
𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) ≅
𝛽
𝑟𝛼
[(
1
𝑟𝛼
)
𝛽−1
𝛾(𝛽, 𝑇) − 2 (
1
𝑟𝛼
)
2𝛽−1
𝛾(2𝛽, 𝑇) ] 
Accordingly, we plug these closed-form approximations for ℙ(𝜏 ≥ 𝑇), 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏) and 𝔼(𝑒−𝑟𝜏𝕀𝜏<𝑇) into 
the feasibility condition to get 
𝑢
𝑣
≅
𝛽 [(
1
𝑟𝛼)
𝛽−1
Γ(β, T) − 2 (
1
𝑟𝛼)
2𝛽−1
Γ(2β, T)] + 𝑟𝛼
𝑒−𝑟𝑇
[1 + (
𝑇
𝛼)
𝛽
]
𝑟𝛼 − 𝛽 [(
1
𝑟𝛼)
𝛽−1
𝛾(𝛽, 𝑇) − 2 (
1
𝑟𝛼)
2𝛽−1
𝛾(2𝛽, 𝑇)] − 𝑟𝛼
𝑒−𝑟𝑇
[1 + (
𝑇
𝛼)
𝛽
]
 
where Γ(𝑠, 𝑥) is the upper incomplete gamma function defined as  
Γ(𝑠, 𝑥) = ∫ 𝑡𝑠−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡 
∞
𝑥
 
and  
𝛾(𝑠, 𝑥) + Γ(𝑠, 𝑥) = Γ(s) = ∫ 𝑡𝑠−1𝑒−𝑡𝑑𝑡 
∞
0
= (𝑠 − 1)! 
This is the condition that has to be satisfied for the pension fund and the subscriber to agree on a 
pension contract when the death time of the subscriber is assumed to follow a log-logistic distribution. 
We present the results of the feasibility condition for several values of 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝑇 and 𝑟 in Table 1 below. 
𝑟 𝛼 𝛽 𝑇 𝑢
𝑣
 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
20 
20 
20 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
30 
20 
10 
 0.0074 
  0.0936 
  0.1322 
0.05 
0.05 
0.05 
20 
20 
20 
1.05 
1,15 
1.20 
30 
30 
30 
0.2201 
0.0651 
0.0602 
0.05 10 1.1 30 0.0095 
 
 
0.05 
0.05 
15 
25 
1.1 
1.1 
30 
30 
0.0311 
0.0721 
0.04 
0.05 
0.06 
20 
20 
20 
1.1 
1.1 
1.1 
30 
30 
30 
0.0458 
0.0987 
0.1245 
 Table 1: Approximation for the feasible ratio 
From Table 1 it is clear that, given the age of a subscriber, when the retirement date 𝑇 increases, the 
feasible ratio 
𝑢
𝑣
  decreases and so the pension fund can afford to pay a higher pension rate to the 
subscriber. In fact, the pension fund can demand lower contribution rates when the contributions are 
made for a long period of time. Furthermore, when the retirement date 𝑇 is sufficiently far away, the 
feasible ratio 
𝑢
𝑣
  is decreasing with respect to 𝛽 and increasing with respect to 𝛼. Our result contrasts 
with Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003, 2007) who find a decreasing relationship between  
𝑢
𝑣
   
and both 𝛼 and 𝛽 for a sufficiently large retirement date 𝑇.  
Table 1 also shows that the higher the short term interest rate 𝑟 the higher the feasible ratio and 
therefore the lower the pension rate the pension fund can afford to pay. In fact, when the interest rate 
increases it becomes more difficult for the pension fund to meet future payments. This will 
consequently force the pension fund to demand higher contribution rates. Again our result contrasts 
sharply with Battocchio, Menoncin and Scaillet (2003, 2007) who find an inverse relationship between 
the feasible ratio 
𝑢
𝑣
 and the short term interest rate.  We also find that, as the retirement date 𝑇 
increases, the probability that the death time will occur after the retirement date decreases. This means 
that more and more, it gets more and more likely that the subscriber will die before retirement or while 
in service. 
Using the derived approximated ratio, we can graphically depict the behavior of the ratio 
𝑢
𝑣
 with 
respect to the parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽. These graphs are shown in Figure 3, where three different values of 
𝑇 and 𝑟 are chosen. In particular,  𝑇 = 10, 20, 30 and 𝑟 = 0.05, 0.06, 0.07 and the values of 𝛼 and 𝛽 
belong to [10,20] and [1.05, 1.15] respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Feasible ratio 
𝑢
𝑣
 
                                                                 
                          𝑇 = 30, 𝑟 = 0.045                                                                 𝑇 = 30, 𝑟 = 0.05 
 
                               𝑇 = 20, 𝑟 = 0.045                                                                𝑇 = 30, 𝑟 = 0.06                    
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                         𝑇 = 10, 𝑟 = 0.045                                                                    𝑇 = 30, 𝑟 = 0.07                       
The first column of Figure 3 shows the behavior of the feasible ratio 
𝑢
𝑣
 for 𝑇 ∈ {10, 20, 30}, while the 
second column analyzes how  
𝑢
𝑣
 changes for 𝑟 ∈ {0.05, 0.06,0.07}. We notice from the second 
column of Figure 3 that changes in 𝑟 does not markedly affect the shape of  
𝑢
𝑣
 . As such, the interest 
rate 𝑟 only affects the magnitude or level of  
𝑢
𝑣
 without concomitantly altering its behavior with 
respect to other parameters.  
 
 
Appendix 3 
Proof of Concavity and Monotonicity of the Value Function 
Under all the suitably stated conditions that must hold for the optimization problem of the pension 
fund, the modified utility function, and hence the value function, is increasing and concave in 𝑊. 
Proof 
We have  
𝜕𝜓
𝜕𝑊
= (𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
−𝜗
(1 + 𝜌 (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌−1
) > 0 
and  
𝜕2𝜓
𝜕𝑊2
= −𝑄 < 0 
10
17,5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
𝛂
𝛽
10
15
20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
𝛂
𝛽
 
 
where  
𝑄 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
{
 
 
 
 𝜗(𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
−𝜗−1
(1 + 𝜌 (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) −𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌−1
)
+
𝜌(1 − 𝜌) (
1
1 − 𝜗
((𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
− (𝑊𝑜(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
1−𝜗
) + 𝑎)
𝜌−2
(𝑊(𝑡) − 𝑀(𝑡))
−2𝜗
]
 
 
 
 
 
> 0 
Hence the modified utility is concave in 𝑊, implying that the first order condition is necessary for 
optimality. This is a standard result in optimization theory. It guarantees that, under suitable conditions 
for the optimization problem, the value function is increasing and concave in 𝑊. Here the value 
function is increasing and concave in 𝑊 because it is a function of the modified utility, which is itself 
increasing and concave in 𝑊. 
